CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUPREME COURT HOLDS
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTE IMPOSING COSTS ON AN
ACQUITTED DEFENDANT VOID FOR VAGUENESS
In sustaining the defendant's vagueness challenge, the Supreme
Court rejected the State's contention that since the statute was
"civil" in character, it did not have to meet the due process
standard of certainty required of criminal statutes. The Court's
language is susceptible of varying interpretationswhich, in turn,
give rise to possibilities for novel applications of the void-forvagueness doctrine.
1 the defendant was acquitted
IN Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,
of two
charges brought under a Pennsylvania statute making it a misdemeanor wantonly to point or discharge a firearm at another person.2 Pursuant to instructions of the court and in accordance with
a state statute,3 the jury assessed court costs against him for one of
the charges. 4 This statute provided in part that "in all cases of acquittals by the petit jury on indictments for [offenses other than

felonies] . . . the jury trying the same shall determine, by their

verdict, whether the county, or the prosecutor, or the defendant
shall pay the costs. ..."

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the imposition of
costs and upheld the statute, characterizing it as "civil" rather than
"penal" in that it provided machinery for the imposition of costs
"not as a penalty but rather as compensation to a litigant for expenses." Thus, the ascertainable standards of guilt required of
penal statutes by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment7 were not regarded as essential to the -validity of this "civil"
U.S. 399 (1966).
tit. 18, § 4716 (1963).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1222 (1963).

1382

2 PA. STAT. ANN.

'382 U.S. at 400.
'A. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1222 (1963). The statute also provides: "whenever the
jury shall determine as aforesaid, that the prosecutor or defendant shall pay the
costs, the court in which the said determination shall be made shall forthwith pass
sentence to that effect, and order him to be committed to the jail of the county until
the costs are paid, unless he give security to pay the same within ten days." Ibid.
(Emphasis added.)
: Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 415 Pa. 139, 144-45, 202 A.2d 55, 58-59 (1964).
1
If a criminal statute fails to define the conduct which it makes punishable, it
may be declared void for vagueness on the ground that it is inconsistent with due
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statute.8 However, the United States Supreme Court reversed and
declared that whatever label was given the act, it provided the state
with a procedure for depriving an acquitted defendant of his liberty
or property and that such a statute must meet the challenge that
it is unconstitutionally vague.9 The statute was held unconstitutional as written because it was "so vague and standardless that it
leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves
judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards,
what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case."'' 0
process of law to mete out punishment without fair notice to those whose conduct
may subject them to sanction. E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520 (1948);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939); Connally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391, 395 (1926); Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951) (dictum).
Moreover, a criminal statute must provide standards adequate to guide the court
and jury in determining whether particular conduct falls within the statutory prohibition. See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947); Screws v. United States,
325 U.S. 91, 151-52 (1945) (dissenting opinion); Cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 264 (1952). See generally Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal,
40 CoRmELL LQ. 195 (1955); Note, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in
Statutes, 62 HARv. L. REv. 77 (1948).
' The trial court had held that the statute was a punitive measure and that, as
such, it failed to meet the requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, for it failed to give notice of the conduct it punished. Commonwealth v.
Giaccio, 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 463, 468-69 (Q.S. Chester 1963). However, the Superior Court
reversed, holding that the imposition of costs did not constitute punishment for the
commission of a crime. Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 202 Pa. Super. 294, 306, 196 A.2d
189, 195 (1963). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stressed that the statute was
"civil in nature" and did not create an offense without properly defining the prohibited conduct. Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 415 Pa. 139, 145, 202 A.2d 55, 59 (1964).
g 382 U.S. at 402.
See, e.g., Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951) (statute
met void-for-vagueness requirements); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court,
309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940) (same); Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 1962)
(statute invalidated as void for vagueness), vacated and remanded on other grounds,

374 U.S. 449 (1963).
Not only are statutes by which the state may deprive individuals of liberty or
property subject to challenge, but also subject to attack are statutes which proscribe
conduct which will give rise to private rights of action for injury caused by the prohibited conduct. See Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S.
183 (1936), where a fair trade law was sustained over a vagueness objection to provisions which recognized a private right of action for damage caused by the sale
of "any commodity" in "fair and open competition" at a price below that stipulated
by contract. Accord, Baltimore 8c O.R.R. v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521 (1925) (statute
requiring locomotive boilers to be "in proper condition and safe to operate" held
to prescribe a sufficiently definite standard of duty).
20 382 U.S. at 402-03.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine has also been extensively applied to statutes
affecting the exercise of first amendment freedoms. However, there is an additional
inquiry in this area, for the vagueness in such statutes is also violative of substantive
due process. Where the defect is procedural, the state is not without power to prohibit the conduct which is deemed unlawful but the means selected violate due process
by failing to furnish adequate notice and adjudicative standards. See Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). Where the defect is substantive, the state in pro-
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The Court also rejected the State's contention that any vagueness
in the statute had been cured by subsequent state court interpretation."' The Pennsylvania courts had construed the statute as permitting the assessment of costs where the defendant, although not
guilty of the offense charged, had engaged in conduct "reprehensible
in some respect," "improper," "outrageous to 'morality and justice,' " or where, notwithstanding his acquittal, the defendant's
"innocence may have been doubtful."' 2 The Court maintained that
such judicial standards nevertheless were so vague as to leave jurors
free to determine "the crucial issue upon their own notions of
what the law should be instead of what it is."'13 The Court noted
that it would be almost impossible for a person to prepare a defense
against such abstract charges as "misconduct," or "reprehensible
conduct." If such terms were used in a statute which imposed "forfeitures, punishments or judgments for costs," the Court indicated
that such "loose and unlimiting" language would certainly prevent
the statute from meeting the requirements of the due process clause.
Thus, such terms could not suffice to make valid a statute which,
standing alone, was void for vagueness.' 4
The two concurring justices viewed the statute as violative of the
most fundamental concept of due process in that it permitted the
jury to punish a defendant after finding him not guilty of any offense charged.' 5 The majority chose instead the void-for-vagueness
rationale, which does not deny the state the power to impose costs
hibiting harmful conduct has framed the statute in terms so broad that it prohibits
or may prohibit conduct which is constitutionally protected and which, therefore,
the state is without power to make punishable. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). See generally
Collings, supra note 7, at 196-97. But see Note, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75-85 (1960).
11382 US. at 403.
12
1d. at 404. The trial court further limited the grounds upon which costs could
be imposed by charging the jury that if the defendant had been "guilty of some
misconduct less than the offense charged but nevertheless misconduct of some kind
as a result of which he should be required to pay some penalty short of conviction
[and] . . . his misconduct has given rise to the prosecution," the costs of prosecution
could be assessed against him. Ibid.
1
3Id. at 403.
1
'd. at 404. But see Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913) ("rule of reason"
construction of the Sherman Act sustained over a void-for-vagueness challenge).
15382 U.S. at 405 (concurring opinions of Stewart, J., and Fortas, J.). The trial
court had noted that the statute seemed to violate due process "substantively" by imposing a punishment or penalty upon a defendant found to be innocent under the
law. Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 463, 470 (Q.S. Chester 1963).
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upon an acquitted defendant but does require the provision of adequate standards for notice and adjudication."6
The majority's reasoning is amenable to varying interpretations
which hold different implications for potential applications of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine. In its most narrow aspect the opinion
could evidence the Court's belief that the imposition of costs upon
an acquitted defendant (with the added sanction of imprisonment
for failure to pay) is penal in effect, whether the statute is labeled
"civil" or "penal." 17 Thus, affixing the "civil" label could not serve
to foreclose the inquiry into the adequacy of the standards under
which penal sanctions could be imposed.' 8 However, the Court's
language more readily supports the premise that any statute which
provides for the deprivation of liberty or property19 must have
that certainty of standard required of penal statutes. As a variation
25 While the majority does not deny the state the power to assess costs against an
acquitted defendant, the practical effect of the holding is the same as that of the
concurring opinions. It is difficult to envision a statute which could be drafted so
as to improve upon the trial court's charge (see note 12 supra) without defining all
of the possible acts which could give rise to a misdemeanor prosecution. Thus, even
though the state is not without power to impose costs upon an acquitted defendant,
the majority furnishes no guidelines for drafting a statute for this purpose which
would satisfy due process requirements of certainty. Compare Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268, 284-85 (1951) (concurring opinion).
Local prosecuting attorneys approved of the trial court's holding, for the statute
permitted juries to compromise their verdicts. Defense counsel invariably included
in their closing argument the observation that the defendant might be punished
without finding him guilty by assessing costs against him. Letter from A. Alfred
Delduco, Chester County District Attorney, to the Duke Law Journal, March 11,
1966.
"?382 U.S. at 402. Whatever label is given the statute, it provides the state with a
procedure for depriving a defendant of his liberty or property and in this case,
where the defendant has been acquitted, the imposition of costs for "some misconduct," id. at 404, constitutes punishment for an offense the elements of which are
undisclosed to the defendant or the jury. The Court asserted that the due process
protection afforded criminal defendants cannot be denied merely because of the
"label a state chooses to fasten upon its conduct or its statute." Id. at 402. See 26 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 632 (1965).
" Under this reading it might be argued that any judicial proceeding which might
result in a judgment might be subject to a vagueness challenge, since refusal to comply
could result in a contempt citation and imprisonment or fine. However, the Court's
language could be restricted to the peculiar facts of the Giaccio case, where the additional sanction was imposed in a criminal proceeding after the defendant had been
acquitted of all the charges against him.
19 The United States Supreme Court has entertained void-for-vagueness challenges against noncriminal statutes. See note 9 supra. Likewise, the Ninth Circuit
held unconstitutionally vague a statutory provision authorizing the deportation of
any alien found to have had a "psychopathic personality" at the time of entry into
the United States. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
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of this interpretation, it might be argued that even though criminal
statutes must be more precise than those which impose civil forfeitures, the latter must nevertheless meet some minimal due process
standards of certainty where individuals may be deprived of liberty
or property.
Whatever the traditional distinction between civil and penal
statutes might connote, the degree of certainty required may be a
function of the magnitude of the sanction imposed. Thus, it might
be asserted that a statute under which small fines were imposed to
ensure observance would not be subject to as strict a requirement of
certainty as would a statute under which long prison terms were
imposed. 20 A vague definition of the conduct prohibited by the
latter statute would be more objectionable from the standpoint
of both the severity of the forfeiture involved and the social stigma
which accompanies such a sanction. However, to grant that the
standard of certainty is less rigorous for a statute imposing a lesser
sanction is not to say that such a statute will be completely immune
from a vagueness challenge. Giaccio appears to shift the inquiry
from the purpose of the statute to its operative effect in subjecting
individuals to deprivations which they might have avoided under
a sufficiently precise standard. Thus, a statute characterized as
"civil" because of its nonpenal purpose would, nevertheless, be
subject to a vagueness challenge if it conditioned the continued enjoyment of prescribed rights upon the observance of ill-defined stan2
dards of conduct. '
The most narrow interpretation of the opinion, which views the
imposition of costs upon an acquitted defendant as penal and thus
subject to a stricter vagueness requirement, would have but limited
application, for Pennsylvania is the only state which authorizes the
20 See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 69-70
n.16 (1960). "The standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is [sic]
higher than in those dependent primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement."
333 U.S. at 515 (dictum).
21iThe Court rejected the argument that the civil-penal distinction was dispositive
of the question of whether a statute must meet the due process requirement of
certainty (see note 9 supra and accompanying text) and indicated that whether a
statute imposed "forfeitures, punishments or judgments for costs," it would be
amenable to a vagueness challenge if its terms were too "loose and unlimiting."
382 U.S. at 404. Thus, it is not the penal purpose of a statute which makes it
subject to a vagueness objection; rather, it is the fact that it may operate to deprive
individuals of their liberty or property for conduct which is not sufficiently delimited.
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assessment of costs against an acquitted defendant. 22 Under the

broader readings, the language which seems to equate "forfeitures,"

"punishments" and "judgments for costs" in discussing the inade-

quacy of such standards as "misconduct" or "reprehensible conduct" a could provide authority for vagueness challenges to state
occupational licensing statutes. These statutes generally provide for
the refusal, suspension or revocation of licenses on the grounds of
"gross immorality," 24 "untrustworthiness or incompetency"' or "un-

professional conduct." 28

Most licensing statutes also list specific

grounds for revocation which relate to the occupational fitness of the

professional practitioner, such as "conviction of a crime an essential
element of which is dishonesty or fraud"2 7 or "gross malpractice resulting in permanent injury or death. '28 However, such statutes also

include one or more of the vague, catch-all phrases mentioned
above.29 If the vague provision were the sole ground for revocation
and the practitioner had a legitimate doubt as to its applicability
22Commonwealth v. Giaccio, 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 463, 470 (Q.S. Chester 1963). Of
course, the decision would discourage enactment of similar statutes in other states
and serve as a warning that the void-for-vagueness doctrine is still a viable concept in
administration of criminal justice.
" 382 U.S. at 404. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
-"E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-907 (1957) (osteopath); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
1680 (8) (dentist).
The Supreme Court has held that "a state cannot exclude a person from the
practice of law or any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene
the Due Process . . . Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957). Thus, if a statutory provision were so
vague as to furnish the practitioner with insufficient notice that his conduct would
constitute grounds for revocation, the procedure by which his license was revoked
would seem inconsistent with the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process.
See 15 HASTINGs L.J. 339 (1964); text accompanying note 21 supra.
5E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. § 71-911 (4) (1957) (embalmer and funeral director); N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAw § 441 (c) (real estate broker).
20E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-407 (1957) (chiropractor); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-133 (1958) (optometrist); ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 91, § 16 (a) (1965) (physician); cf.
text accompanying note 14 supra. See also McMurtry v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
180 Cal. App. 2d 760, 4 Cal. Rptr. 910 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960) ("habitual user" held too
uncertain a criterion, so physician's failure to file narcotics report not "unprofessional
conduct'); Kronholtz v. Connecticut State Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 21 Conn.
Supp. 332, 154 A.2d 619 (Super. Ct. 1959) (optometrist's practicing in the employ of a
store held not to constitute "unprofessional conduct').
E.g., ILL. RFv. STAT. ch. 110 , § 44(b) (1965) (public accountant); ILL. Rnv. STAT.
E
ch. 114!, § 8 (b) (1965) (real estate broker).
8
E.g., ILL. RiEv. STAT. ch. 91, § 16 (a) (3) (1965) (physician).
20 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-911
(1957) (embalmer & funeral director); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 72-407 (1957) (chiropractor); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 1680 (dentist);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 91, § 16 (a) (1965) (physician); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 114 ,§ 8 (1965)
(real estate broker); N.Y. REAL PRoP. LAw § 441 (c) (real estate broker); see notes
24-26 supra.
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to his conduct,30 under the broader interpretations of Giaccio he
might challenge the provision as imposing a forfeiture without the
certainty of standard required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. As applied to him, the standards of "gross immorality" or "unprofessional conduct" would provide no notice that
his conduct was prohibited. In addition the standard is so vague as
to leave the licensing board free to decide his case according to its
own predilections and to preclude meaningful court review of the
administrative decision. 31
The vagueness objection goes to uncertainty in the definition of
conduct for which sanctions may be imposed. However, Giaccio
may provide authority for a vagueness challenge to the practice of permitting a jury to determine the nature and extent of
the sanction to be imposed, even though guilt be established under a
statute which adequately defines the punishable conduct.3 2 In addition to providing notice, a statute must be sufficiently precise to
guide jurors in determining whether specific conduct falls within
the statutory proscription. 3 Mr. Justice Stewart warned that much
of the majority's reasoning serves to cast constitutional doubt on the
o These two factors are relevant in determining whether the practitioner has a

tenable ground upon which to assert the vagueness objection. If other, more specific
statutory provisions were violated (see notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text)
the practitioner would have had adequate notice that the prohibited conduct would
result in revocation. However, if the vague provision is the sole ground for revocation and the practitioner's misconduct is unrelated to his professional competence,
then he may be deprived of his right to practice without notice as to the conduct
prohibited. Clearly the term "unprofessional conduct" does convey some notion
of the conduct proscribed. This is especially true where custom or the canons of the
profession make the vague phrase a word of art with a very definite meaning. However, if the practitioner's conduct does not fall within one of the more specific pro.
visions, he is forced to speculate as to the permissibility of particular activities at the
risk of losing his license. Where he has acted in the genuine belief that the prohibition
did not apply he is in a stronger position to assert its vagueness.
This application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine is to be contrasted with its
use in first amendment cases which deal with statutes which may, by their overbreadth, inhibit constitutionally protected activity. In the latter cases one may invoke
the vagueness challenge even though his conduct falls squarely within the statutory
See note 10 supra.
proscription.
1
It might be argued that the presence of a vague provision in an otherwise
certain statute could affect the administrator's decision to the prejudice of the practitioner. Although the conduct in question might not dearly fall within the more
specific prohibitions, the broad proscription of "unprofessional conduct" might lead
the administrator to resolve questionable violations of specific prohibitions against
the practitioner on the theory that they are included in the broader proscription and
are, therefore, unlawful whether all of the elements of the specific offense are present
or not.
"2 See note 34 infra.
"See note 7 supra.
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practice of leaving to "the unguided discretion of a jury the nature
and degree of punishment" to be imposed upon a convicted criminal
defendant.3 4 The majority stated that a law must not be so vague
and standardless as to leave "jurors free to decide, without any legally
fixed standards," what is or is not prohibited.3 5 Further, the jury
must not be permitted to "make determinations of the crucial issue
upon their own notions of what the law should be instead of what
it is." 3 6 This language might indicate that guidelines must be

furnished to limit the jury's discretion in differentiating conduct
deserving of a lesser penalty from conduct deserving of a greater
penlity. Otherwise, the conduct for which the defendant might be
punished (through an increase in sentence) would be undefined,
and the jurors' determination would reflect their definition of what
constitutes punishable conduct. It is arguable that the jury's discretion when it acts as the assessor of penalty should be no less subject to conditions and reviewable standards than when it acts as the
finder of fact to determine guilt or innocence.
If, despite the majority's disclaimer,37 unlimited jury discretion
in fixing criminal punishment would be subject to attack, then under
those broader readings of Giaccio which require the presence of
ascertainable standards in noncriminal statutes imposing forfeitures,
the analogous practice in civil cases of leaving punitive damages to
the unguided discretion of the jury might also be subject to challenge.38 Here, too, the jury is permitted to decide the extent of
the defendant's liability according to their own notions of "what the
"3S82 U.S. at 405 (concurring opinion). The majority declared its intention not to
cast doubt on the practice of leaving "to juries finding defendants guilty of a crime
the power to fix punishment within legally prescribed limits." Id. at 405 n.8. Apparently the majority felt that the prescription of maximum and minimum penalties
in criminal statutes provided sufficient limitations on the jury's discretion in fixing
punishment. However, the tenor of Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion indicates that he
might have viewed the majority's condemnation of leaving "judges and jurors free
to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in
each particular case," as casting doubt upon jury discretion even where maximum and
minimum sentences are prescribed. Id. at 402-03. (Emphasis added.)
5Id. at 402-03.
:1 Id. at 403.
37 See note 33 supra.
38 If the maximum-minimum limits on punishment in criminal statutes suffice to
save jury discretion in criminal cases from the vagueness challenge, the Giaccio
majority might have greater difficulty in upholding jury discretion in punitive damage
cases where there are no maximum-minimum limitations imposed. On the other hand,
the punitive damage issue arises in "civil" cases which may require less certainty of
standard to satisfy due process (cf. text accompanying notes 20-21 supra).
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law should be." 39 Subject to the limitation that the damage award
will be set aside if it is grossly excessive, 40 the jury is left without
guidelines to determine whether and on what grounds a greater or
41
a lesser penalty should be imposed.
Giaccio thus evinces a potential precedential value far greater
than the immediate holding might indicate. The Court's rejection
of the civil-penal distinction drawn by the Pennsylvania courts suggests possible applications of the void-for-vagueness limitation in
many "civil" areas heretofore considered beyond the compass of the
due process requirement of certainty. Civil forfeitures, such as
exclusion from one's profession, are currently viewed as constituting
deprivations which are as severe as some criminal sanctions. 42 Reliance on the civil-penal distinction to determine which statutes
must provide sufficiently precise standards will in the future be
unjustified, however. While practical considerations militate against
requiring legislatures to define all acts which may suffice for forfeiture, a judicial inquiry which posits the requisite degree of certainty as a variable which turns upon the extent of the deprivation
sought to be imposed might be a desirable beginning.
39 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
Although practical considerations may diminish the effectiveness of attempts to
impose limitations upon jury discretion, the vagueness concept may motivate judicial
or legislative attempts to check jury arbitrariness. While it would be impossible to
prescribe all of the factors which should be considered in assessing punishment or
punitive damages, some guidelines can be provided. For example, standards to guide
the jury's determination in assessing punitive damages in libel actions might include
the defendant's willingness to retract (in jurisdictions where retraction is not a bar
to punitive damages), repetition and compounding of the libel, and actual abuse of the
plaintiff.
"oSee, e.g., Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 225 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Ga. 1964), afJ'd,
351 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1965); Wanamaker v. Lewis, 173 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1959);
Kern v. News Syndicate Co., 20 App. Div. 2d 528, 244 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1963).
1"The conduct left undefined is only that for which a varying penalty might be
imposed. The threshold conduct upon which guilt or innocence depends must be
adequately defined (see note 7 supra). However, given the majority's condemnation
of unlimited jury discretion in making determinations of what is or is not prohibited
(see text accompanying notes 34-35 supra), the adequacy of the definition of conduct
which determines the extent of punishment or liability may similarly be open to
question.
"Exclusion from one's profession may be comparable to the imposition of a
criminal sanction with respect to the severity of the deprivation and the dishonor
caused by the forfeiture. Compare Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Cohen v. Hurley,
366 U.S. 117, 145-47 (1960), with his majority opinion in Giaccio juxtaposing "forfeitures," "punishments" and "judgments for costs," 382 U.S. at 404.

